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Abstract 
Situated at the intersection of the literatures on soft power and mega-events, this paper explains the 
production and evolution of the dominant narratives behind the 2018 Men’s Football World Cup in 
Russia. It begins from the premise that there are multiple unexplored dimensions to the concept of soft 
power and proposes three advancements: the existence of multiple audiences for soft power narratives, 
the necessity of examining soft power aspirations in the context of hard power constraints, and the 
investigation of both of these dimensions with a view that acknowledges the role of time. Exploring 
both externally and internally targeted narratives, this paper demonstrates not only the attempts by 
Russian authorities to construct hegemonic ideology among the domestic population, but also reveals 
how the interplay of hard power and soft power concerns changed these narratives over time. 
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Introduction: Legitimizing the World Cup  
Over coffee at FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) headquarters in Zurich, an 
executive from the Russia 2018 Local Organizing Committee explained an insider’s view on hosting 
the Russian World Cup:  
 
“You must understand, there will always be criticism about how much everything costs… That 
is normal… But we are doing all this for the benefit of our country! We are investing into things 
that will improve the quality of life for the people.”   (November 2015, Zurich)  
 
Here, the executive summarized one of the central narratives surrounding the 678 billion 
rubles (approximately US$ 11.4 billion) invested into the preparations for the World Cup 
(Russian Federal Government 2017). Of this budget, only 29.4% went to constructing stadiums 
and other facilities necessary for the sport, while the bulk went towards improvements in 
transport infrastructure (airports, train stations, and roads), telecommunications, and 
security. These were the improvements in quality of life that the executive referred to and, in 
sharing this perspective, he framed the World Cup as more than an international sporting 
exhibition: rather, he presented it as a widespread investment program benefitting the eleven 
Russian host cities and their citizens.  
 
This paper explores the messages created by Russian authorities to explain and legitimize the 
World Cup. It begins by following scholars who employ a soft power framework to 
understand mega-event rationales (Brannagan and Rookwood 2016; Grix and Lee 2013; Grix 
and Houlihan 2014; Grix, Brannagan, and Lee 2019; Nygård and Gates 2013), basing the 
analysis on three refinements. First, it differentiates between external and internal audiences 
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for the Russian soft power project. Second, it explores the interplay between soft power 
aspirations and hard power realities. And third, it analyzes these dynamics over time.  
 
This work represents the first in a trilogy of papers that analyzes soft power in the Russian 
World Cup. The companion papers focus on domestic audiences, tracing the mechanisms by 
which narratives were carried and exploring the reactions of host city residents. The 
remainder of this paper situates this work within the broader literature of soft power in mega-
events, examines why Russian mega-events are important, and unpacks – over time and in 
context with hard power – the narratives that legitimized the World Cup both to international 
audiences and to Russian citizens.  
 
Unpacking soft power in mega-events  
The idea that the Russian executive shared – that hosting was valuable in ways that 
transcended sport and would benefit the population over the long term – was one of the 
dominant narratives of the World Cup. Throughout the eight years of preparations, this 
framing was repeated consistently to the Russian population by officials at all levels, from 
municipal administrators to the president. 
 
Using mega-events like the World Cup or the Olympics for reasons beyond sport is nothing 
new, and indeed represents one of the primary raisons-d’être for scholars to study these global 
spectacles. There is a vast multidisciplinary literature on how mega-events have been used to 
communicate particular messages for political ends (Allison 1986; Armstrong and Mitchell 
2008; Bairner, Kelly, and Lee 2017; Bloyce, Smith, and Smith 2009; Grix 2015; Houlihan, White, 
and White 2003; Horne 2017; Horne and Manzenreiter 2006).  
 
To make sense of these political aspects of sport, some scholars take inspiration from the 
notion of soft power (Nye 1990; 2005), referring to the ways in which states can achieve foreign 
policy goals through cooptation and attractiveness rather than through force. The intention 
here is to build upon the notion of soft power, imported from the fields of political science 
and international relations, and applied to mega-events. In this way, hosting a mega-event is 
seen an attempt for states to boost soft power and to reframe international perceptions of their 
nation on the world stage, in a kind of sports diplomacy (Grix and Houlihan 2014; Nygård 
and Gates 2013). Foundational work in this vein has demonstrated the value of unpacking 
mega-events through the lens of soft power, situated at the intersection of political science, 
international relations, and sports studies (Grix 2012; 2014; Grix and Brannagan 2016). 
Through these explorations, it has become clear that the world’s so-called emerging 
economies have attempted to leverage mega-event hosting as part of their soft power toolbox 
(Cornelissen 2010; Grix, Brannagan, and Lee 2019; Grix and Lee 2013). Indeed, the world’s 
most prestigious mega-events have been hosted increasingly by countries outside of the 
advanced economies of the Global North and West. This has inspired studies of mega-event 
soft power in these nations, including the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing (Manzenreiter 
2010; Preuss and Alfs 2011), the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Cornelissen 2014), the 2014 
Winter Olympics in Sochi (Alekseyeva 2014; Wolfe 2016), and the combination of the 2014 
World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil (Grix, Brannagan, and Houlihan 2015).  
 
There is a much English-language literature on Russia and soft power (for a sample of this 
diversity, see Feklyunina 2016; Tsygankov 2006), but this does not necessarily focus on the 
role of mega-events. Of the relatively sparse literature on Russian soft power and mega-
events, the majority deal with the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, in particular detailing how 
Russian geopolitical strategy  also attempted to leverage soft power at domestic populations 
(Alekseyeva 2014; Grix and Kramareva 2017; Wolfe 2016). These studies offer alternative 
analyses of the Sochi soft power project as an exercise that functioned on international and 
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domestic levels, with emphasis on the nuances of domestic developments. Situated with these 
endeavors, this paper seeks to advance this work by beginning with the understanding that 
soft power – at whatever level – is not as simple as “getting others to want what you want” 
(Nye 1990, 167), and that mega-events present an opportunity to reveal the complications in 
applying this concept to real-world situations.  
 
Following Nye (2011), soft power is conceptualized as a relationship between agent and 
target, which can be understood as the creator and intended recipient, respectively, of a given 
soft power project. Within this relationship, three soft power resources have been identified: 
culture, political values, and foreign policies. Narratives are the vehicles that carry these soft 
power resources from creator to recipient, but this is first predicated on the conditions that 
the culture be attractive, the values be authentic, and the policies be legitimate and moral (Nye 
2011, 84). If the recipient perceives inauthenticity or illegitimacy, then they will not be 
attracted. In other words, if these fundamental conditions are not met, the narrative 
transmission is rejected and the soft power project falters. Thus, soft power is not a concrete 
tool or a predictable machine, but rather something socially constructed, intangible, relational, 
and subjective. With these sensitivities in mind, an examination of the preparations for the 
2018 World Cup reveals three areas where the concept of soft power requires adjustment.  
 
Refining an approach to mega-event soft power  
The first problem is that soft power is typically conceptualized as separate from hard power, 
and few mega-event studies accommodate political projects where hard and soft approaches 
might intersect, overlap, or blend. If soft power is seen as a means to coopt others to want 
what you want, then hard power here means the ability to command or to order (Nye 1990, 
166), relying on military and/or economic strength. Though Nye (2011, 21) ultimately eschews 
a binary view, portraying soft and hard powers on a continuum (with one co-opting and the 
other commanding), this interpretation still presents the powers fundamentally as opposites. 
Further, when states employ both hard and soft powers to achieve their goals, this 
combination has been called “smart power” (Nye 2008). Studies on Russian mega-events tend 
either to focus on one a time – on hard or soft power – with only a minority working from a 
smart power view. Among these are Grix and Kramareva (2017), who divide the Sochi 
Olympics between international hard power and domestic soft power. Similar work compares 
Sochi 2014 to the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, situating Russian/Soviet mega-event hosting 
within a grander geopolitical context, and demonstrating how hard power realities 
dominated potential soft power gains (Kramareva and Grix 2018). 
 
While building on this scholarship, this paper argues that a smart power view still tends 
towards conceptualizing hard and soft powers as discrete. In contrast, mega-events like the 
2014 Sochi Olympics and the 2018 World Cup reveal that soft and hard powers are not 
necessarily so opposed as imagined: they can intermingle, sometimes complementing one 
another, sometimes contradicting. Hard and soft powers are contingent and mutable, engaged 
by heterogenous methods at various times and dependent on a variety of actors, targets, and 
contextual conditions. During the 2018 World Cup, for instance, Russia’s international 
conflicts existed uneasily alongside the mega-event-driven narratives of openness, 
hospitality, and international cooperation (Wolfe 2019). As crystallized by the Ukrainian crisis 
of 2013/2014 that soured relations between Russia and the West (Trenin 2014b), the tensions 
between hard and soft powers shaped the articulation of the World Cup and complicated the 
nation’s soft power goals. Put more simply, a purely soft power lens is insufficient to explore 
the totality of what is happening in Russian mega-events. Nor does a smart power view do 
justice to the ways in which hard and soft powers blend, complement, and contradict, as will 
be shown during the preparations for the Russian World Cup.  
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The second problem with a traditional soft power analysis is the tendency to focus only on 
the motivations for the project, and not the target. Thus, we see a preponderance of 
scholarship grounded in explaining mega-events in terms of diplomatic policy (Almeida, 
Júnior, and Pike 2014; Cornelissen 2010; Giulianotti 2015; Manzenreiter 2010), but 
comparatively little about the results or effects of those projects. In other words, if we 
conceptualize the soft power project as a complete equation composed of narrative 
generation, transmission, and reception, most studies tend to focus only on the first element 
while neglecting the latter two.  
 
Along these lines, there is also a tendency to assume that the target audience for soft power 
narratives is of a different nationality, exemplified by Nye’s emphasis on cultural 
attractiveness as one of the key resources of soft power. This stems from the concept’s origins 
in international relations and political science, but analyzing mega-events through a soft 
power lens complicates this view. A standard interpretation holds that mega-events are used 
as a signaling strategy, that is, as an attempt to reframe perceptions of the host nation on the 
international stage for place promotion or broader geopolitical goals (Horne and Whannel 
2016; Preuss and Alfs 2011; Whitson 2004). While this interpretation is accurate, it also elides 
the fact that soft power can be aimed at the domestic population just as readily as the 
international, and often mega-events are comprised of a diverse mix of narratives and 
intended targets, both foreign and domestic (Alekseyeva 2014; Caffrey 2008; Grix and 
Kramareva 2017; Wolfe 2016). Soft power can be aimed outwards and inwards, and it is 
possible to refine the soft power lens to discern between external and internal audiences.  
 
This is a separate body of literature that focuses on internal audiences for mega-event projects, 
but eschews the soft power lens. Typically, this scholarship explores how mega-events are 
leveraged toward nation-building or national identity projects within the borders of the state 
(Gorokhov 2015; Koch 2013; 2017; Militz 2016; Tomlinson, Bass, and Bassett 2011). This is 
another example of the familiar dynamic of a state instrumentalizing mega-events for its 
political goals, but these scholars rarely conceptualize these processes as soft power. And yet 
these projects are manufactured by the state and transmitted to a chosen audience for a 
particular political purpose, and they often involve attraction, persuasion, and co-optation 
rather than coercion or force. This paper argues that, in many cases, mega-event-driven 
nation-building and national identity projects represent cases of domestically targeted soft 
power, and analyzing them through this framework reveals dynamics that would otherwise 
remain unseen.  
 
Finally, the third problem with traditional soft power is a tendency to ignore the passage of 
time. There is an illusion of stability cast by many studies of mega-event soft power, where a 
snapshot of the narratives – usually excluding both the hard power context and the potential 
domestic audience – is too often taken as constitutive of the whole. But mega-events are long 
affairs, typically involving nearly a decade of preparations before the opening ceremonies. As 
such they are subject to temporal logics: given changing political economic circumstances, soft 
power narratives may wax or wane, as certain arguments gain or lose effectiveness, while 
entirely new narratives might also appear.  
 
Methodology for a more nuanced soft power analysis  
Taken together, these three problems highlight the inadequacy of a traditional soft power lens 
and suggest that the conceptualization and operationalization of soft power should be 
augmented in order to make sense of mega-events. Since soft power is inherently intangible, 
subjective, and contingent, this paper does not claim to advance a universal prescription. But 
for the purposes of analyzing developments for the Russian World Cup, the rest of this paper 
is guided by the following sensitivities.  
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First, the multiple targets for the Russian soft power project must be acknowledged. Given that soft 
power consists of a relationship between agent and target, the argument begins by delineating 
international and domestic targets. This division could be refined further, and could even be expanded 
to identify multiple agents as well, but for the moment a simple distinction between external and 
internal targets will suffice. Next, the preparations for the 2018 World Cup must be situated within the 
hard power constraints of Russian geopolitics, allowing for an interplay between hard power and soft 
power that is more nuanced and contingent than the currently deployed usages of smart power. And 
finally, Russian mega-event soft power narratives must be considered over a complete lifespan, from 
submitting the bid in 2010 to the opening of the championship in 2018.   
 
This analysis is based on a research project from 2015 - 2019, combining documentary research with 
fieldwork and interviews in FIFA headquarters in Switzerland and on the ground in Russian World 
Cup host cities. The project was inductive, informed by constructivist grounded theory, where research 
questions were developed iteratively in dynamic interplay with the field, and material was coded 
according to theme with qualitative data analysis software (Charmaz 2011; Thornberg and Charmaz 
2014). The material gathered and generated for this paper includes the official candidature files (also 
known as the bid books) that launched the World Cup, Russian planning documents from federal, 
regional, and municipal levels, and internal FIFA documents regarding the quality of the Russian bid 
and the progress of developments. These provided the official textual background to explain the World 
Cup from the perspective of organizers and government officials. Further, Russian media was collected 
and analyzed from 2014 – 2018, comprising over 6,000 articles from mainstream and independent news 
sites, blogs, and social media. The arguments in this paper are drawn in particular from media articles 
featuring government and organizing committee speeches and press releases from officials at all levels 
of Russian bureaucracy. Finally, interviews and discussions were conducted with Russian organizers 
and government officials involved in the preparations for the World Cup, in order to corroborate or 
disprove themes that had been discovered in the foundational documents, as well as to identify new 
themes organically. Residents of Russian host cities were also interviewed, but as they do not feature 
in the generation of soft power, they will not be featured in this paper (though their reception of soft 
power narratives will be discussed in the companion papers to this project). In synthesizing these 
documents, articles, and interviews, this paper attempts to capture and analyze the multiplicity of 
narratives in the Russian World Cup soft power project.  
 
Throughout all this, the attention to soft power narratives is not intended to reinforce the notion of one 
‘true’ rationale for hosting the World Cup, nor does the argument reinscribe an interpretation of the 
Russian state as a singular entity. Rather, this paper endeavors “to push beyond the all-too-frequent 
unitary readings of why political leaders choose to host sports mega-events” and instead follow some 
of “the infinitely varied symbolic politics and geopolitical encounters that arise” out of the Russian 
World Cup (Koch 2018b, p.2013). 
 
 
Multiple audiences for Russian soft-power narratives 
The Russian executive whose quotation began this paper framed the World Cup as a long-term benefit 
for the Russian people. This was a typical presentation by figures in positions of organizational and 
governmental authority, and over the life of this research project, there were no instances noted where 
an official presented the World Cup as anything other than an unmitigated good. Depending on 
circumstance, the scope of this beneficence was either broad and vague or narrow and specific, but in 
both cases, organizers often exaggerated to the point of platitude and hyperbole. 
 
For instance, Alexander Djordjadze was a key player at the national level in both the bidding 
and the organizing committees for the World Cup. In July 2016, he spoke at the Moscow 
Urban Forum and summarized the rosy potential of hosting: “It is a chance for all of us to 
improve our lives, to use this mega-event as a catalyst for positive change,” (Djordjadze 2016). 
This was a typically vague framing, with the World Cup presented as a universal benefit. 
Separately, in a regional event, a lower-ranking member of the Ekaterinburg local organizing 
committee said:  
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“The championship will increase our tourist attractiveness. We’re improving not just hotels 
and transport infrastructures, but also personnel training and service culture… We must be 
world class… None of this would be possible without the World Cup.”    
 (October 2015, Ekaterinburg) 
 
As opposed to Djordjadze, the regional administrator was specific, tying the mega-event to concrete 
improvements in the functioning of the city. In both cases, though, these officials presented the World 
Cup as providing opportunities and bringing progress. Further, in both instances, these men were 
addressing mostly domestic audiences, and the narratives they delivered were aimed largely at Russian 
ears.  
 
At the same time, World Cup soft power narratives were also targeted at international audiences, and 
there also existed multiple target groups within these domestic and international audiences. Figure 1 
illustrates these divisions, with the proviso that these groupings could overlap and were not necessarily 
as clear-cut as shown, given that people often inhabit multiple roles and identities.  
 
 
Figure 1: International and domestic audiences for 2018 World Cup soft power narratives, showing overlaps between groups.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates several important aspects of the soft power relationship in the Russian World Cup. 
First, narratives were created by actors within the central state. As the project itself was hatched and 
organized from within the state apparatus (Golubchikov and Wolfe 2020), so too was the event’s 
messaging. Throughout the years of preparations, officials at all levels were responsible for crafting 
and reproducing the ideas that launched and legitimized the World Cup, and these efforts constituted 
a concerted attempt to create an “official transcript” or would-be hegemonic ideology (Scott 1992).  
 
Further, this illustration of the multiple audiences for the Russian soft power project is not intended to 
be a static representation, but rather one snapshot of a dynamic process. Indeed, the soft power system 
pulsed with multiple overlapping narratives existing simultaneously, aimed at various groups and 
engaged at different times. Regardless of the content of the narratives, however, in general they were 
disbursed from the top and flowed down through various technologies to the general population.  
 
A look at World Cup narratives  
The primary World Cup soft power narratives were located not only in speeches by organizers, but 
also in the foundational documents that established Russia’s plans and hopes for hosting. The bid books 
present the first instance of soft power narratives for the 2018 World Cup and represent a necessary 
starting point for understanding the soft power narrative landscape. These narratives were aimed at 
both international and domestic audiences, though since the purpose of the bid book was to convince 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Unstable Soft Power 
 7 
FIFA to grant hosting rights to Russia, there was a tendency in the bid books to prioritize international 
targets. Nevertheless, narratives aimed at domestic audiences were included throughout the bid books 
as well, aiming to fulfill FIFA requirements related to social responsibility and human development 
(FIFA 2007).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Foundational narratives for the 2018 World Cup, including representative quotations from the 2018 bid books. 
Source: Russian World Cup Bid Committee, 2018 
 
Examining both international and domestic targets, the foundational World Cup narratives can be 
sorted into groups according to theme, as shown in Figure 2. These are categorized as: Markets, 
Improving Football, Development, Government Support, Diversity and Global Importance, and 
Openness and Readiness. The category of Development is best split into two subcategories, both of 
which were presented as bringing long-term benefits after the conclusion of the event. The first 
Development subcategory was centered around infrastructure, and saw hosting as a catalyst for 
infrastructure projects, both the creation of new infrastructures and the acceleration of existing 
developments. Conversely, the second Development subcategory was based on social benefits, seeing 
the World Cup as the engine of social development, including the promotion of sport for healthier 
lifestyles and the creation of new professional capacities. 
 
Put together, these seven groupings comprised the foundational narratives used in the attempts to 
create an official transcript or hegemonic ideology in order to explain the World Cup. Exploring each 
narrative in turn reveals some of the potential conflicts and instabilities within the fundamental 
priorities that underlay the World Cup, starting before the bid was won.   
 
Beginning with the financial dimension, the narrative of Markets was tailored to satisfy one of FIFA’s 
core goals: to expand the global reach of the World Cup (Radford 2010). Thus, the Russian bid dangled 
the possibility of opening formerly inaccessible markets to FIFA and other international sport 
businesses: 
“Russia represents a young and dynamic population and a new market of fans for FIFA… Russia’s 
proximity to Western and Central Asia, as well as the Middle East, will provide FIFA with greater access 
to this large, growing target market.”         (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010 vol.2, p.149) 
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Despite its status as a non-commercial entity, FIFA has a multibillion-dollar flagship property to 
manage. The narrative of Markets highlights the fact that this mega-event exists beyond sport or even 
politics, and that money is the engine of the World Cup.  
 
At the same time, the World Cup cannot exist without sport, so another of the dominant themes was 
the narrative of Improving Football. This was tailored to fit with one of FIFA’s central goals: 
contributing to the development of institutional football at international and domestic levels, and the 
organization strives to ensure that the World Cup improves both the quality of infrastructure and the 
level of play in the host nation. To fulfill these aspirations, the Russian bid was targeted at improving 
facilities and organizational competences related to national football. This was the only narrative in the 
World Cup that was explicitly related to sport, and despite grandiose promises of the potential benefits 
to the Russian game, it occupied only a small portion of the overall narrative landscape. 
 
In contrast, the bulk of the narratives that explained the World Cup were devoted to overall national 
improvement not explicitly related to sport, as explained by an organizer in the federal LOC: “We have 
a large task – to develop the country,” (June 2016, Moscow). This term – development – indicated a 
wide-ranging modernization campaign that framed the World Cup as a program of national 
importance far beyond a simple tournament. As before, this applied both to material infrastructures 
and social capacities, but since the Development narratives were so prevalent, it makes sense to split 
into two subcategories, Infrastructure and Social. Alexander Djordjadze discussed this in terms of the 
after-effects of hosting:   
 
“On behalf of the organizing committee, I can tell you about the essence of the World Cup, not from the 
point of view of the sports competitions, but about its impact on the country as a whole... Of course, there 
will be a legacy after the World Cup. Legacy is the key word… It’s something that I would divide into 
two categories: material and immaterial. The material legacies are primarily infrastructure… and the 
immaterial legacies are the development of new technologies, new modes of social behavior, and new 
competencies.”      (Djordjadze 2016) 
 
Here, while emphasizing the idea of the World Cup framed not as a sports championship but rather as 
a project of national development, Djordjadze explained that hosting would change the quality of life 
in the chosen peripheral host cities, brought about by improved infrastructures and modernized 
practices. 
 
Investments into infrastructure were the most expensive and extensive World Cup interventions, and 
were heavily discussed at all levels, from the federal to the municipal. A typical example of these 
narratives came from the Russian president:  
 
“We have created modern airports, train stations, roads, highway interchanges, and advancements in 
digital technologies and smart management systems. It is important that this infrastructure will be 
integrated harmoniously into the country’s transport framework and that it will serve the dynamic 
development of our regions, our cities, and the business activities of our country as a whole. And, of 
course, that it will improve the quality of life of our people.”    (Kremlin.ru 2018) 
 
Here, as witnessed with other officials, the president framed transit improvements as a boost to the 
quality of life – and one that would be enacted unproblematically with existing systems. This narrative 
was repeated regularly, at all levels, from the beginning of the preparatory period and continued even 
after the games had closed.  
 
One of the reasons for the prevalence of these narratives is that interventions into the built environment 
are immediately visible. It is easier to appreciate a sparkling new airport, after all, than it is to judge the 
effectiveness of a multiyear, national investment program for developing youth football. At the same 
time, these visible interventions are also disruptive to the conduct of daily life and have the potential 
for sparking discontent. For this reason, the Infrastructure Development narratives served a double 
purpose, publicizing the visible benefits of hosting while preempting possible criticism.  
 
Yet infrastructure improvements were not the only Development narratives present in the World Cup. 
Moving away from the material domain, the narratives of Social Development were also discussed in 
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terms of bringing long-lasting benefits to the host population. These were usually presented as a form 
of job or skills training that would give workers practical experience: 
 
“Thousands will have the opportunity to learn new skills: the event will develop new football 
administrators, trainers, drivers, hospitality experts, transport engineers and construction workers, to 
name a few. These roles will teach life-long skills offering hope for a better future for a more highly 
trained, skilled workforce.” (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010 vol.2, p.150) 
 
These narratives fit into the ideas of Russian modernization – an implicit presentation of the nation as 
somehow lagging, particularly in comparison to the West. This is an old pattern whereby Russia is 
discursively presented as a backwards land that must catch up to the more developed West through 
industrialization and reform (Krastev and Holmes 2018; Mau and Drobyshevskaya 2013; Robinson 
2006). This is a common scenario in many post-socialist nations, and one of the reasons that post-
socialist elites covet mega-events is because they can be used to make claims to a particular, western 
vision of modernity (Koch 2010; Militz 2016; Roche 2002). At the same time, many post-socialist nations 
also host mega-events because of a genuine needs to improve aging infrastructure (Müller and Pickles 
2015). The Russian World Cup addressed both of these imperatives, constructing and upgrading 
infrastructures in the host cities while also imparting new skills, all in an effort to present a coherent 
picture of a modern nation. 
 
These aspirations were so large as to be impossible without the backing of all levels of government. 
Government Support, then, was another group of narratives, whereby organizers communicated the 
wholesale administrative coordination behind the World Cup:  
 
“A national priority for the Russian Federation and a risk-free choice for FIFA… The government 
guarantees all resources necessary for the staging of a tournament that will exceed every expectation of 
FIFA.”   (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010 vol.2, p.149) 
 
Russian organizers backed up their claims of unqualified government support by signing all the 
contractual government guarantees requested by FIFA – something that most other candidate hosts 
failed to do (FIFA 2010). They also touted the official support of the Russian president and prime 
minister, as well as the mandated cooperation and coordination between fifteen national ministries 
(Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010, 391). It was an impressive show of unity behind the bid 
and demonstrates the importance placed by authorities on winning the rights to host.  
 
Finally, the narratives of Diversity and Global Importance referred to Russia’s standing in the global 
arena, reminding international audiences of the nation’s status as a “great power” (Mankoff 2009; 
Neumann 2008). At the same time, the narratives of Openness and Readiness presented the nation as 
modern and tolerant: 
 
“A diverse, yet inclusive society, both multi-cultural and united, Russia is a nation of progress and pride, 
a modern country with a vibrant future. Friendly and open, we possess a genuine spirit of hospitality, a 
peaceful embrace of multi-culturalism, and a common and passionate love of sports.”  
  (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010 vol. 1, p.11). 
 
Given the current tensions with the West, to say nothing of contemporary Russia’s increasing 
conservatism and self-styled position as the defender of “traditional values” (Makarychev and 
Medvedev 2015; Stepanova 2015), this presentation of the nation as tolerant and open is a marker of 
how much has changed in the past decade.  
 
The narratives of Diversity and Global Importance, combined with those of Openness and Readiness, 
aimed to remind the world of Russia’s importance, all while portraying the nation as modern, dynamic, 
stable, and ready for further international integration. The historical context is crucial to unpacking 
these narratives, as the bid was written in 2009 - 2010, during which time official policy was targeted 
at increasing international cooperation in order to pursue a widespread modernization agenda 
(Kremlin.ru 2008; Medvedev 2010). Thus, Russia was presented by the bidding committee as great and 
storied, yes, but also new and open; developing, yes, but also stable. Under President Medvedev, who 
himself was framed as a youthful reformer, the World Cup organizers promoted Russia as a great 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Unstable Soft Power 
 10 
nation, transitioning from a painful past into a fabulous future. And the World Cup would be part of 
that historic transition. 
 
The bid book openly discussed these goals for international integration and domestic development: 
“Russia’s future now depends on cooperation and integration with the world community,” (Russia 
2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010 vol.3, p.389). In this light, hosting the World Cup in Russia would 
both acknowledge the nation’s progress since the fall of the USSR, as well as encourage continued 
development towards fuller political and economic integration with the West. These foundational 
narratives did not survive unmolested in the time between bidding and the opening game. 
 
 
Stable and unstable narratives 
Once Russia won hosting rights for the 2018 World Cup, organizers decided which of the thirteen 
proposed bid cities would become an actual host city. From the start, the city of Volgograd was 
considered one of the candidates to be cut: the quality of the city’s infrastructure was too low and, 
therefore, the cost of accomplishing the necessary work would be too high. Conversely, hosting the 
World Cup in Volgograd would be richly symbolic: formerly known as Stalingrad, the city was the 
bloody but triumphant turning point of the Second World War.  
 
President Putin was asked about Volgograd’s chances as host city during an organizing committee 
press conference. He replied: “Kak zhe nam pobezhdat bez Stalingrada?” (Novie Izvestiya 2018), or in 
English: “How could we possibly win without Stalingrad?” This quip was brilliant politics. In six 
words, he tied history and culture into the needs of the present, engaging the patriotic memory of the 
Second World War and combining it with football triumph. Aside from patriotic politics, this remark 
also speaks to the contingencies inherent in soft power. First, the statement was aimed at a domestic 
audience and can only be grasped in the context of Russian and Soviet cultural history. Second, this 
ploy was effective only in Volgograd, where the war remains an indelible part of the city’s character. 
Finally, the issue of time factors into this narrative as well: having invoked the Battle of Stalingrad once, 
neither the president (nor any other officials) could do so again – at least not without cheapening the 
effect or sparking controversy. All told, these aspects underscore the contingent and unstable nature of 
soft power narratives: they are not constant, predictable, or stable, but rather fluid, contingent, and 
subjective.  
 
Just as most soft power scholarship tends to concentrate on international targets, so too do they often 
fail to consider the contingent nature of the narratives brought to light by an attention to temporality. 
Instead, most studies implicitly present the narratives of a soft power project as singular and stable, 
while ignoring the idea that multiple narratives might exist, targeted at multiple audiences, with all of 
these elements shifting dynamically over time (Chitty et al. 2017; Grix, Brannagan, and Houlihan 2015; 
Ji 2017; Manzenreiter 2010). A view that acknowledges the temporality of soft power narratives 
provides a more nuanced interpretation of developments, particularly given that there are numerous 
opportunities for social, economic, and political changes during the nearly ten years that pass between 
winning a bid and opening the games. 
 
Examining the seven thematic groups with a view toward the passage of time reveals that the 
foundational narratives of the World Cup were decidedly not stable. As shown in the simplified 
timeline in Figure 3, there were three modes of changes noted: narrative disappearance, appearance, 
and continuity. Starting from the initial seven, the first group disappeared after the bid was won, the 
second appeared only after the Ukraine crisis in 2013/2014, and the third remained relatively consistent 
throughout the entire preparatory period.  
 
These changes can be explained by examining the narratives in the context of their time. For example, 
three groups of narratives were relevant only during the bidding phase, and once the Russian 
organizers won the rights to host, they no longer had to argue for the merits of their bid. This is why 
the narratives of Diversity and Global Importance, Markets, and Government Support disappeared 
from the narrative landscape and made no more appearances in speeches of organizers and authorities, 
press releases, or news articles. At the same time, four of the original seven narratives remained viable 
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throughout the years of preparations. It becomes clear, then, that while some of the World Cup 
narratives were rendered obsolete after winning the bid, others were unaffected by the passage of time.  
 
 
Figure 3: Continuity and (dis)appearance of foundational narratives for the 2018 World Cup, over time. 
 
The third group was comprised of new narratives that appeared due to hard power concerns unrelated 
to the mega-event: the volatile geopolitical context engendered by the Ukraine conflict (Sakwa 2015; 
Trenin 2014a) forced hard power constraints into the mega-event soft power project. Two new 
narratives were generated, and some of the initial narratives grew more complicated. Of these new 
narratives, one group was targeted mostly at international audiences in a display of Russian strength, 
while the other faced largely inwards and portrayed Russia under threat in a sort of siege mentality. 
Maria Zakharova, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a typical statement to the domestic audience: 
 
“The anti-Russian campaign in the western press is connected to the 2018 Football World Cup… Soon, 
we will all witness active measures by the West… they will take very serious actions in regards to Russia 
hosting this event. Of course, their goal is to disrupt it. They will use all information tactics available… 
There will be many surprises… We are hurrying to counteract the PR campaign that prepares this 
informational trash.”   (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017) 
 
Sparked by hard power conflict, this belligerent tone contrasted starkly with the World Cup narratives 
of openness and international cooperation. In speeches, press releases, and news articles, national and 
regional media began distributing the narratives of Russia – independent and indomitable – under 
threat from malevolent foreign forces that sought to attack the World Cup. Yet simultaneously, these 
same media outlets and influential individuals continued propagating narratives of openness and 
hospitality to foreigners within the context of hosting. In this way, hard power tensions exploded from 
the geopolitical realm, generating new narratives that coexisted uneasily with some of the old 
narratives.  
 
This paradox of simultaneous hostility and hospitality was managed by sorting foreigners into two 
groups. The first was the good foreigners, that is, those visitors who loved football and were coming to 
Russia because of sport. Alongside their love of football, these foreigners might want to see Russia for 
themselves (and thereby deliver themselves from western anti-Russian propaganda), and they were 
imagined to be apolitical – unless they spoke in favor of the current political order and the president, 
in which case they were celebrated as enlightened foreigners who might try to stay in the country after 
the event (Kharunova 2018; Uzbekova 2018).  
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In contrast, the second group was composed of bad foreigners, meaning those who questioned or 
criticized the World Cup, threatened the established order, or who were otherwise politically active. 
There was a concerted effort to portray critical voices as an army of malevolent foreigners digging for 
negative news about the World Cup and therefore, by proxy, about Russia (Mamotina 2017; 
Polyanichko, Baldenkova, and Karpova 2017). This conceptual blending between mega-event and 
nation allowed organizers to defuse criticism of mega-events developments from within and without. 
Particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, framing questions about the World Cup as part of 
an orchestrated propaganda campaign against Russia allowed organizers to defend against even 
legitimate criticism. In this way, even credible allegations – for instance of human rights violations 
during stadium construction (Human Rights Watch 2017; Melnæs 2017; Ruggie 2016) – were largely 
disarmed. 
 
As it relates to this discussion about soft power, however, the overall point here is to note how the 
geopolitical, hard power conflict affected Russia’s World Cup soft power narratives. Looking at 
developments with a view toward time brings to light the fluid and contingent nature of these 
narratives, demonstrating how hard power and soft power clash and blend, and how old narratives 
can fade while new narratives can arise. In the 2018 World Cup, the unstable nature of the narrative 
landscape resulted in paradoxes and dissonances that required novel solutions to address. This is why 
foreigners were presented as either honored guests or malevolent threats. In order to maintain the 
hegemonic ideology that explained the World Cup to the domestic population, authorities developed 
the means to make sense of the contradictions between the narratives of openness and the narratives 
of a nation under threat.  
 
Conclusion: Unstable soft power  
As one of the world’s most prestigious mega-events, the Men’s Football World Cup is a potent tool for 
authorities to accomplish goals beyond sport. This is an especially attractive proposition for the new 
generation of hosts outside of the Global North and West, many of whom aspire to use the mega-event 
as a soft power strategy to reframe international perceptions of the nation (Black and Westhuizen 2004; 
Caffrey 2008; Cornelissen 2010; Grix, Brannagan, and Lee 2019).  
 
In recent history, this soft power strategy has been attempted with various levels of success in Beijing 
(Preuss and Alfs 2011; Zhang and Zhao 2009), South Africa (Cornelissen 2010; 2014), London (Grix, 
Brannagan, and Houlihan 2015), Rio de Janeiro (Almeida, Júnior, and Pike 2014), and more. In Russia, 
the 2014 Sochi Olympics represented the nation’s first effort to use a top-tier mega-event to reframe 
perceptions (Alekseyeva 2014; Grix and Kramareva 2017). On the international level, that project failed 
due to the conflict with Ukraine, but with the domestic population the project was largely successful 
(Wolfe 2016). Examining soft power in Sochi 2014 demonstrates both the intermingling of hard and soft 
power concerns, as well as the existence of multiple audiences for soft power projects.   
 
This paper applies this more nuanced interpretation of soft power to the 2018 World Cup in Russia. 
Further, it expands the soft power framework to explore the creation and evolution of soft power 
narratives over the entire preparatory period, from winning the bid to opening the games. In so doing, 
it not only documents the foundational soft power narratives that accompanied and explained the 
World Cup, but also moves beyond the narratives themselves in order to explore the messy ways in 
which hard and soft powers intertwine, aimed at a variety of different audiences, and all of this subject 
to change over time.  
 
Examining the predominant World Cup narratives from bidding to hosting reveals how unstable soft 
power projects can be. Over the preparatory period, the Russian federal state complemented the 
original World Cup narratives (of hospitality, openness, as well as the benefits of the World Cup 
development program) with narratives of national pride and the Russian history of strength in the face 
of external threats. In the midst of this maneuvering, the narratives of international integration and 
Russia as a new and developing nation, which were mostly targeted towards FIFA and most applicable 
during the bidding phase, quietly disappeared.  
 
The changes in the composition of the World Cup soft power narratives were spurred by events 
unrelated to sport but, due to the international nature of both the political troubles and the mega-event, 
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the Ukrainian crisis overlapped with the World Cup and gave rise to narrative contradictions. Put 
another way, the second half of the World Cup preparatory period provoked the unstable nature of 
soft power narratives, as developments became a narrative jumble of openness, inclusion, and 
development, intermixed with nationalism, caution, and isolation. Thus, the utopian soft power visions 
engaged by the World Cup soft power project at the outset of the preparatory period were rendered 
partially obsolete by hard power concerns.  
 
Overall, framing the World Cup preparatory period within the conceptual scaffolding of soft power 
allows for a novel interpretation of the nation- and identity building processes common in mega-events 
(Gorokhov 2015; Koch 2017; Tomlinson, Bass, and Bassett 2011). This interpretation reveals attempts 
by Russian authorities to establish a hegemonic ideology – targeted at the domestic audience – that 
legitimized the World Cup as beneficial for the population over the long term. These benefits were 
discussed concretely as modernized infrastructures and abstractly in terms of improved quality of life. 
This establishes the domestic goals of soft power within a broader understanding of the strategies of 
governmental cooptation and coercion, and how mega-events can be used in those attempts.  
 
In this light, this paper offers three theoretical contributions, the first of which is a reorientation of soft 
power scholarship towards the domestic. Rather than the familiar story of a host nation attempting a 
geopolitical reframing of international perceptions, this view allows for a new perspective on domestic 
issues by framing them as projects of national importance managed via mega-events by the state. This 
is particularly true for Russia, where the high degree of centralized control of the World Cup means 
that soft power narratives can be considered governmental strategy (Nygård and Gates 2013), thereby 
providing new tools to analyze the relationships between state and population. 
 
Second, this paper encourages an analysis of soft power in fuller context, making space for hard power 
constraints in interplay with soft power aspirations. For Russia, the dramatic souring of international 
relations that followed the hard power conflict in Ukraine resulted in a shift in World Cup soft power 
narratives. Hard power meant an existential threat to the World Cup, notably in the fear that the games 
would be stripped from Russia (AIF 2015; Ivanov 2016; Slyusarenko 2016). For this reason, new soft 
power narratives emerged in the aftermath of the conflict in order to adapt to these hard power 
conditions. Moreover, this was couched in a discursive blending of the World Cup with the Russian 
nation itself, meaning that an attack against either was construed as an attack against both.  
 
Finally, the blending of hard and soft powers is most visible when examining a soft power project over 
time, so a view that accommodates temporality is the third contribution presented by this paper. In this 
light, mega-events represent an ideal subject, as nearly a decade typically passes during the 
preparations for hosting, giving ample opportunity to witness geopolitical changes and new political 
configurations. Taking a wider view, this means that soft power is not as stable as previously imagined, 
and that a view towards the instabilities of soft power provides opportunities for deeper and more 
nuanced investigations.  
 
In defying easy categorization, the Russian World Cup illustrates these nuanced dynamics and 
problematizes the traditional ways in which both soft power and mega-events are understood. The 
fundamental narratives that accompanied and explained the World Cup represented an attempt at 
ideological hegemony, whereby authorities could produce and maintain an official transcript of the 
proceedings. This attempt to craft and inculcate hegemonic thought was not as uniform, stable, or 
consistent as might be imagined by a traditional reading of soft power. Instead, a messier and richer 
understanding can be discovered by unpacking the narratives over time and in terms of their multiple 
audiences and intersections with hard power. Even something as straightforward as the idea of the 
mega-event improving quality of life turns out to be less simple than it seems. Rather, through the 2018 
World Cup, soft power is revealed as contingent and unstable – a corrective to the more uniform 
representations that have dominated most soft power scholarship so far. 
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